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Palestinian
Tareq Abu Dayeh, owner of Chairman Arafat shop,
stands outside his souvenir store in Gaza
between posters of slain Hamas leader Sheikh
Ahmed Yassin |
On Thursday, 26 January 2006, the world
woke up to news of the stunning victory of the
Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas,
over its main rival Fatah in the
Palestinian legislative elections. Virtually all
observers had predicted that Hamas would make
significant gains and might even have a slight lead over
Fatah, the governing party of the Palestinian Authority
(PA). None -- and probably few within Hamas itself --
expected that the movement would take 74 seats out of
the 132 contested seats.
Indeed, one could say without
exaggeration that Hamas has outperformed itself, the
enormity of the victory taking the movement by surprise,
throwing its leadership off-balance, at least in the
immediate aftermath of the elections. To be sure, Hamas
hadn't hoped and certainly didn't plan for a landslide
win. Hamas had repeatedly indicated that it would prefer
to be in a position to influence the government, but not
to govern itself.
In pre-election interviews Hamas leaders
and candidates voiced their hope that the movement would
win between 50 and 55 seats, which would have enabled
the movement to assume the role of a strong opposition
to a presumed Fatah-led government. It is now amply
clearly that Hamas itself failed to appreciate the
extent of the Palestinian public's disenchantment with
the PA, including its misgovernment as well as failure
to get Israel to end its occupation of the Palestinian
homeland.
Widespread corruption and graft
permeating the PA -- indeed, rampant nepotism,
favouritism, embezzlement and cronyism, as well as
chronic lawlessness, chaos, and lack of personal
security for the average Palestinian -- had a strong
impact on voter behaviour. But it is also true that the
underlying reasons for the democratic coup have to do,
first and foremost, with the increased savagery of the
Israeli occupation, which is nothing short of an act of
rape, and the PA's failure not only to end the
occupation but even to mitigate its manifestly brutal
effects, impacting all aspects of Palestinian life.
Indeed, ever since the conclusion of the
Oslo Agreement more than 10 years ago, Israel
effectively confiscated over 50 per cent of the West
Bank and implanted in occupied land dozens of
Jewish-only colonies inhabited by Talmudic messianic
fanatics, most of whom view non-Jews as scum, vermin and
dirty animals that ought to be exterminated. Moreover,
Israel effectively deprived Palestinians of the vast
bulk of their freedoms and human rights and jailed tens
of thousands of political prisoners in detention camps
without charge or trial.
The accumulative outcome of this policy
of repression, along with the frustrations of a failed
and futile peace process that only provided a cover for
Israel's genocidal treatment of the Palestinians,
eventually led the Palestinians to shun Fatah and opt
for Hamas. True, Hamas will not be able to achieve
miracles for the Palestinian people, especially as far
Palestinian efforts to end the Israeli occupation are
concerned. To be sure, Hamas didn't promise voters that
it would liberate Jerusalem in the next four years or
get millions of refugees repatriated and compensated.
However, Hamas, which ran on a "Change and Reform"
platform, promised to put the Palestinian house in
order, which is doubtless the first step towards
national liberation.
Hamas will face many challenges and
pitfalls, especially if the US and the EU follow through
on threats to sever economic aid to a Hamas-led PA. The
Quartet, whose members (US, EU, Russian and UN) met in
London on Monday to discuss the rise to power of the
Islamist movement, has urged Hamas to abandon armed
resistance and recognise the state of Israel. In
addition, the Israeli government moved to withhold a
badly-needed $40 million dollar fund of tax returns,
apparently for the purpose of deepening the
post-electoral victory crisis facing Hamas, and
indicating to the Palestinian people that Israel is the
ultimate boss, not any Palestinian government.
Hamas is already seeking to avert a
head-on collision with the international community,
especially in the absence of any semblance of Arab
solidarity. Hamas leaders in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip sought in earnest to assure the international
community that the movement would respect the
international commitments of the PA but urged the world
to respect the Palestinian people's free choice. This
week, winning Islamist candidates told Western media,
which flocked to Palestine to cover the "Palestinian
Tsunami", that Hamas would prove itself to be a force of
moderation and peace, and that the movement would
definitely move to mend its erstwhile negative image.
On the domestic front, Hamas is seeking
to form the broadest possible coalition government,
probably one that would include academics and
technocrats, untainted with the "terror" canard. Hamas
has been urging Fatah to join the upcoming government,
arguing persuasively that the weight of the Palestinian
national burden exceeds the ability of any one faction
to bear.
Fatah, embittered by its crushing defeat,
has so far refused to join the contemplated Hamas
government, on the grounds that Fatah should leave its "foe"
and "rival" to "face its fate". "Let it fail, so that
the people will see," said one angry Fatah candidate.
However, it is likely that some Fatah leaders will
sooner or later join the Hamas-led government, either
out of concern for national responsibility or the
attraction of public office.
There is no doubt that Hamas will have
to carefully and wisely navigate both itself and the
entire Palestinian national destiny through the
treacherous waters of forming a functional government
under occupation at home and amid hostile international
storms and currents. To do that, Hamas will have to show
not a small amount of pragmatism, including a possible
de facto recognition of Israel.
There is no guarantee, however, that
Israel will reciprocate. Israel believes that Hamas'
victory is dangerous, not so much because of the "violence
issue" or non-recognition of Israel (which Israel
utilises for propaganda purposes) but rather because
with Hamas in government, Israel would not be able to
force the PA into succumbing to Israeli blackmailing
tactics.
Needless to say, Israel wants a weak
Palestinian partner that can be easily bullied into
submission, a partner that would accept functional
arrangements here and there, one that would more or less
accept an enhanced and less harsh Israeli occupation,
instead of genuine liberation from a nefarious and
dehumanising colonialism, all in return for vague
commitments to a Palestinian state without known borders
and, indeed, without substance.
Hamas will not be that kind of partner
and will insist on total and absolute Israeli withdrawal
from the 1967 territories, including East Jerusalem.
This is Israel's real concern, not Hamas' armed
resistance and refusal to recognise Israel.
This is why Israel will seek to use
every possible red herring or distraction to evade the
crux of the matter; namely the need to adopt a strategic
decision to give up the stolen land and spoils of the
1967 War.
